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The Thai economy has performed extremely well in recent years. 
What is especially interesting is the unique &et of economic policies 
implemented during this period of accelerated growth. Often dubbed 
"Thaksinomics," these policies represent a distinct break from the past. To 
Prime Minister Thaksin's followers ti}e new economic measures are not 
only capable of returning Thailand to the pre-1997 glory days of high 
growth, but perhaps even more importantly, enabling the country to 
successfully coexist economically with China. 
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We must accept that the global economic landscape in the new millennium 
is much different than in preceding decades. 
Thaksin Shinawatra, Pdme Minister of Thailand 
Introduction 
Prior t.o the Asian Economic Crisis sparked by the collapse of the 
Thai baht in 1997, Southeast Asia looked like a sure bet for a long 
period of high, sustained economic growth. Its membership in the elite 
group of industrialized countries seemed assured. The crisis came as a 
complete surprise to many area experts, and brought an end to the era 
of the "Asian Miracle." While growth rates are gradually edging 
upwards, the region has not been able to restore the pre-crisis mecha-
nisms that propelled many of its countries out of poverty and into near 
affluence. 
As a region, Southeast Asia's economies are the most open to inter-
national trade. While such openness spurred their growth for several 
decades, in the post-1997 period it has left them increasingly vulnerable 
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to adverse economic and political shocks. The region suffered a 
tremendous blow to its technology exports when the 2001-02 recession 
spread to the region following the collapse in America's information 
technology investment. Increasing competition with China for foreign 
investment and export markets is also making it harder for Southeast 
Asian economies to sustain growth rates approaching those attained in 
the pre-1997 period. 
Compounding the region's economic woes was the powerful Bali 
terrorist attack and its impact o.n tourism. U.S. and other Western 
intelligence sources have confirmed the presence of powerful terrorist 
networks throughout the region - Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand and Philippines. The openness of these economies makes them 
especially vulnerable to terrorist acJ:s. 
Despite these challenges, the Thai economy began accelerating 
from a growth rate of 1.9 percent in 20Ql (the year Dr. Thaksin was 
elected Prime Minister) to 5.3 percent in 2002, to a projected 6.5 
percent in 2003, with forecasts of even higher rates in the next several 
years. 1 Compared with the Thailand that went hat in hand to the IMF in 
1997, Thailand today is a nation transformed: in addition to its 
impressive growth, its foreign debt has dropped by two-thirds, and the 
stock market soared 69 percent during the first three-quarters of 2003.2 
Tha.iland has built on its recent economic successes to quickly be-
come one of the United States' most valued allies in Asia. The country 
has cooperated closely with the United States in regional counterter-
rorism operations and, unlike many nations, has actually made good on 
its pledges to send troops to Iraq as well as Afghanistan.3 The payoff is 
sure to be substantial, as evidenced by the United States' recent 
designation of Thailand as a major non-NATO ally4, and the beginning 
of negotiations for a free trade agreement between the two countries.5 
Finally, the country's recent economic success has in the eyes of 
many observers6 elevated Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to the 
status of likely successor to fill the void left as Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohamad steps down as head of APEC (Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation).7 Clearly, under Thaksin Thailand is becoming 
one of the pivotal states in Southeast Asia.8 
What is especially interesting about Thailand is the unique set of 
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economic policies implemented during this period of accelerated 
growth. Often dubbed "Thaksinomics," these policies represent a 
distinct break from the past. To Thaksin's followers the new economic 
measures are not only capable of returning Thailand to the pre-1997 
glory days of high growth, but perhaps even more importantly, enabling 
the country to successfully coexist economically with China, while, at the 
same time, making Thailand a less fertile grom)d for terrorism. 
This essay examines the phenomenon of Thaksinomics. What does 
it replace? What are its main assumptions? The key policies and 
programs implemented to date? The likelihood of its success? 
Origins of Thaksinomics 
To its defenders9 Thaksinomics is a pragmatic response 10 to the void 
created by the demise of two key paradigms that formed the basis of 
much of the pre-1997 economic policy-making in East Asia: the 
Washington Consensus, to a certain extent a set of policies imposed 
from outside the region, and the East Asia Economic Model (EAEM). 
A somewhat related factor, the observed decline in productivity in the 
1990s, no doubt also played a significant role in the development of 
Thaksinomics. 
Demise of 1he Washington Consensus 
Before the Asia crisis in 1997, most technocrats and businessmen in 
Thailand believed that the country's economy should be relatively open. 
This openness provides access to technology and capital. Technocrats 
had long believed that increasing openness was needed to force Thai 
companies to become more efficient and to break down old monopolies. 
Hence liberalization and privatization had been staples of economic 
policy since the mid-1980s.u 
The 1997 Asian crisis brought this view into question, along with a 
number of related conventional wisdoms of the time, the most notable 
being the so-called Washington Consensus, an agreement of outlook 
among the multilateral agencies in Washington - the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) - on a set of free market 
policies that formed the basis for the conditions under which those 
agencies lent to developing countries. 
Under the Consensus, countries were encouraged to promote liber-
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alization by reducing barriers against imports with a view to eventually 
achieving free trade. Privatization of state owned enterprises and 
financial deregulation were also key ele.ments in Washington Consensus 
policies. In short, governments were expected to withdraw from 
economic activity and intervene as little as possible. Free market prices 
were seen as the most important factor in promoting successful 
development. 
In the 1990s these policies began to ·be questioned, not only by 
academic writers but also by the World Bank itself. The double-digit 
annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in China since the start 
of its economic reform program in 1978 has not been achieved by 
universal free markets, free trade or widespread privatizations. The 
Chinese experience suggested tha! the state can promote development 
by intervention in the economy. Looking back on the Asian Crisis it is 
also apparent that its cause was not the result of too much government 
< intervention, but of too little - a failure to.regulate financial markets. 
Pasuk and Baker's12 analysis of the 1997 Thai crisis goes even further, 
arguing that the transformation of Thai institutional structures to 
conform to the mandates of the Washington Consensus on limited state 
economic intervention are precisely what caused the crisis. 
Increasingly, throughout Asia a post-Washington Consensus out-
look is emerging which stresses that markets can fail - especially 
financial markets and markets for technology - and that governments 
should intervene to promote domestic competition, regulate financial 
transactions, promote education and ~timulate the inward transfer of 
technology. 13 This particular view of government intervention has 
become one of the key elements of Thaksinomics. 
Limitations of the East Asia Economic Model (EAEM) 
As its name suggests, the EAEM is a development strategy some-
what unique to Asia. The strategy is built around two key features: (a) 
high investment rates stemming mainly from foreign direct investment 
(FDI), and (b) an outward orientation emphasizing labor intensive 
manufactured exports. Multinational corporations often play a dominant 
role in both aspects - supplying FDI and mass-producing goods for the 
export market. In practice, it is the development model followed by the 
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majority of Asia/Pacific countries, including Thailand, since the late 
1970s and early 1980s. 
Imbalances created over time by the implementation of the EAEM 
have undermined its effectiveness in generating high and sustained rates 
of growth. For example, Lian 14 notes that the common pattern is for the 
·Asia/Pacific region's terms of trade to worsen nearly every time global 
demand for electronics, agricultural product~ or primary commodities 
declines sharply. 
[The] Asia/Pacific region's pursuit .of the EAEM directly contributes to 
global imbalances and negatively affects the performance of Asian 
companies as well as the standard of living of the region's workers and 
households. The logic is simple, in our view, excess saving exacerbates 
the global savings imbalance that· in turn necessitates imbalances in 
trade; in turn the nature of trade and production subjects the region to 
a vicious cycle of price wars and worsening terms of trade. 15 
Breaking this vicious cycle of price wars is another key component 
of Thaksinomics. Here it should also be noted that even in the hey-day 
of the EAEM, Thailand's openness 16 relative to other countries, while 
high, began declining in the early 1990s (Figure 1 ), suggesting that the 
EAEM model was encountering diminishing returns in terms of 
integrating the country into the world economy. 
It is also not clear that the EAEM model was enabling Thailand to 
utilize its resources in the most efficient manner. In his analysis, Porter17 
found a strong relationship between his Microeconomic Competitive-
ness Index (MCI) and per capita income, with over 81 percent of the 
differences in country per capita incomes accounted for by the index. 
However, Thailand's per capita income is considerably lower than one 
'would anticipate, given the country's MCI. In this sense the Thai 
economy was clearly underperforming in the early 2000 period. Korea, 
Malaysia, China and Indonesia also fell in the under-performer group, 
while, given their MCI scores, Singapore and Taiwan's per capita 
incomes were in line with what one might expect. Hong Kong was the 
only country in the region classified as an over-achiever - incapable of 
sustaining its per capita income with no improvement in its microeco-
nomic fundamentals. 
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Adverse Trends in Total Factor Productivity 
In part, the increasing limitations on growth imposed by the EAEM 
manifest themselves in the observed tr~nds in the country's total factor 
productivity (TFP). TFP measures the efficiency of a given set of input 
factors, capital and labor in generating output. Alternatively it can be 
thought of as the level of technological development in the economy - a 
given amount of factor input will generate more or less output depend-
ing on the country's technological capacity.'TFP is a critical variable for 
sustaining long-term growth because unlike increments of capital and 
labor it is not subject to diminishing returns. 
In its assessment of the trends of TFP in Thailand, the IMF18 found 
that the high rates of growth in the pre-1997 period were driven by 
capital accumulation, rather than TFP growth. Even more significantly, 
IMF estimates show that TFP growth slowed during the 1990s. This 
finding is similar to that of other researchers (Table 1 ). 
These patterns no doubt account tor' the fact that in terms of the 
overall competitiveness of its products, Thailand lags behind several of 
its East Asian competitors: Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea and 
Malaysia, with China quickly closing the gap (Table 2). It should be 
noted that Thailand did improve its competitiveness during the first two 
years (2001-02) of the Thaksin administration. 
Given likely demographic and investment patterns in the country, 
the IMF concluded that medium-term economic growth in Thailand will 
have to be driven by TFP growth rather than accumulation of capital 
and labor. This shift in the country's growth mechanism represents a 
sharp contrast with the pre-1997 growth pattern driven largely by capital 
accumulation. 
The need for TFP-led output growth underscores the importance of 
maintaining an environment that is conducive to efficiency gains and 
technological development. It is in this light that Thaksinomics will be 
examined below - is this new approach to development in Thailand 
likely to succeed in creating the necessary conditions for expanded 
productivity and growth? 
The Core Elements ofThaksinomics 
Like Reaganomics in the 1980s, Thaksinomics is controversial. It is 
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an eclectic strategy that combines the traditional element of the EAEM 
model, emphasizing mass manufacturing spearheaded by foreign direct 
investment - dubbed the First Track - and a more domestic focus on 
local enterprises leveraging indigenous skills and resources, known as 
the Second Track. A distinctive feature of Thaksinomics is the emphasis 
given the Second Track. 
As in the past, the First Track is oriented \owards creating relatively 
high paying jobs and earning foreign exchange. The Second Track on 
the other hand focuses on activities that will not come into direct 
competition with China. A major goal of Thaksinomics is to pursue both 
goals in a manner that gradually shifts the Thai economy from export 
dependence to greater reliance on the more controllable domestic 
market. Thaksin envisions this proces~ increasing domestic consumption 
to 60% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from the current level of 
55%. Simultaneously the goal is to reduce sxports as a proportion of 
GDP from 60% to 50%. 
The rationale for the two track strategy is straightforward: most 
developed countries have a smaller proportion of exports to GDP than 
do the East Asian economies. Therefore, they are less vulnerable to 
external shocks like the terrorism incident in Bali, the SARS epidemic, 
or a slowdown of the U.S. economy. 
The idea is to stimulate domestic demand in the short run through 
increased government expenditures, while simultaneously searching for 
new local industries to develop as part of the diversification away from 
EAEM activities. At the same time, domestic market focused policies 
can achieve structural change by assisting business in moving up the 
value added chain, thus keeping ahead of direct Chinese competition. 
While it might appear that Thaksinomics represents a retreat from 
globalization, this is not the case. Although the policies are more 
domestically focused, they are not meant to discriminate against foreign 
capital. In fact Thailand is still aggressively attempting to attract foreign 
direct investment (FDI). 
Implementation - ·First Stage 
Implementation of Thaksinomics has evolved through various 
stages. One of the key elements in Thaksinomics is the focus on poverty 
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alleviation, especially in rural areas. Initial policies were geared toward 
providing small fiscal doses aimed at reviving rural demand and creating 
housing demand for low-wage government workers, rejuvenating 
underdeveloped resources and indigenous skill-rich small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) with good growth potential. Another key 
element was assisting under-leveraged households to achieve hjgher 
levels of consumption. Implementation ha~ occurred through a variety 
of unique projects. The most urgent policies that the Thaksin govern-
ment initially implemented were those aimed at empowering the 
grassroots. 
Farm Assistance 
The first programs were focused on the agricultural sector, starting 
with a three-year moratorium on farmers' debt payments to the Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BBAC). This was the initial 
step in reforming the debt structure <fln.d maturity profile of the 
agricultural sector to match the crop production cycle. At the same time, 
the government is attempting to upgrade land rights to be used as bank 
collateral. 
Urban Relief 
The urban poor also benefit from incentives brought about by the 
government. Small loans for street-side vendors are provided through 
the Government Savings Bank (GSB). The GSB provided individuals 
loans worth 30,000 baht each for a total of 10 billion baht in 2002. 
Retired Civil Servants 
A special spending package was also set up for retired civil servants. 
Under this program the government will pay an amount equivalent to 30 
times salary to the families of civil servants who pass away. A new ruling 
permits retired civil servants to spend half of that amount before their 
death. It is estimated that the total amount of spending power created 
from this initiative would be roughly 45 billion baht. 
To boost grassroots access to financing, the Thaksin administration 
set up a number of new institutions: 
The Village Fund 
The first was the Village and Urban Revolving Fund. To many, Dr. 
The Journal of Social, Politicalxmd Economic Studief 
Thaksinomics: A New Asian Pardigm? 73 
Thaksin's election campaign pledge to provide 1 million baht ($24,000) 
to each of Thailand's 70,000 villages was a populist handout, but it is 
actually a revolving loan program. The -program is unique in that it 
specifically targets projects aimed at stimulating the rural economy. 
Village leaders and bankers will identify projects and provide loans at 
4% interest (commercial farm loans cost 5%-8%) to be guaranteed by 
community groups. The intent of the $1.6 billion Fund is to enable 
farmers to increase productivity, and value added, through developing 
new activities such as processing and packaging. The Fund can also be 
drawn on by individuals, households or groups to start their own small or 
micro-enterprises. 
The People's Bank 
This newly created bank is another grassroots credit facility set up to 
provide credit to micro-enterprises. In addition to providing financing to 
groups without access to the formal bankitig- system, the goal of the 
Bank is also to promote entrepreneurship among the poor and the small 
traditional producers in villages. 
The Bank for Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SME:s) 
SMEs play a critical role in Thaksinomics and the Bank for Small-
and Medium Sized Enterprises is the financial component of the 
Government's overall SME promotion program. SMEs account for 40-
50 percent of the Thai economy's GDP, 38 percent of the total value of 
exports and 69 percent of the country's jobs. Thaksinomics singles out 
SMBs because of their potential to adjust to fast changing conditions, to 
reach certain market niches more rapidly than bigger companies and to 
innovate in terms of products and process. 
One Tambon Project 
This program is nationwide, covering nearly all of Thailand's 7,252 
districts. One Tambon is predicated on the idea that every Thai tambon 
(sub-district) has a variety of specialized local products. The key 
assumption of the project is that each community has a comparative 
advantage in one or more of these traditional products. The project's 
role is to assist the communities in modernizing the production and 
distribution process of these products so that they can be competitive at 
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the national and international levels. The government's role is to 
identify candidate products and then to assist their development through 
providing necessary support for their ev~ntual success. 
The program is clearly intended to find new niches in foreign mar-
kets and develop new winners that will provide an alternative to the 
foreign direct investment-based and mass produced exports products 
that the country has been fast losing to China and other countries in the 
region ~ith cheaper labor. · 
Other programs introduced during this period include: 
Housing projects for state' workers and the low income masses 
introduced in 2001 and 2002, respectively; 
Various small and medium sized enterprise (SME) development 
initiatives introduced since :3001; and 
The comprehensive State-Enterprise Privatization Program started 
in 2001. < 
Clearly, it is a early to critically evaluate these initial attempts. 
However it is safe to say that these programs, along with some of the 
government's other fiscal activities have contributed to terminating asset 
deflation, reviving domestic demand and bringing about positive asset 
demand and asset price expectations.19 
In addition there are some encouraging results stemming from the 
One Tambon project. Government figures put total sales of village 
enterprises under the program at $558 million in 2002, with an average 
profit margin of 26 percent. Their products are also finding their way to 
the shelves of luxury shops in Japan, the United States and Europe, thus 
enabling the village producers to earn four or five times more on each 
item than when sold in the local market. 
Implementation - Second Stage 
The second stage of Thaksinomics is intended to build on the first. 
In large part this is a more innovative, albeit controversial, stage. 
The Capital Creation Scheme 
Tentatively scheduled to start in December 2003, the Thai govern-
ment plans on introducing a new program to redefine or reclassify assets 
so that they carry the underlying legal rights or documentation necessary 
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for collateralized bank loans. The program has an ambitious agenda 
including the reclassification of land assets, intellectual-property assets, 
machinery assets, public pavement and stalls assets and rental-right 
assets. The basic idea is to legalize different assets so that the owners 
can use them fully to get access to capital. This should be of particular 
benefit to poor or low income earners. 
The basic idea underlying this program i~ not new, but is one that 
has been advocated for years by Peruvian economist Hernando de 
Soto.20 What de Soto has found is that most people in developing 
nations hold defective forms of asset's such as properties and stalls that 
lack the documentation or legal status that gives them access to capital. 
Because the right to these possessions is not adequately documented, 
these assets cannot readily be turn~d into capital, cannot be traded 
outside the narrow local circles where people know and trust each other, 
and cannot be used for collateral for a loan. ~pparently, the government 
aims to have the state-owned banks make a\,-ailable some 200 billion 
baht to support the next wave of loans arising from this asset-
reclassification scheme. 21 
The question is whether this program will further help low income 
people or saddle them with more debt; and whether the program will 
have adverse financial consequences to the country in the long term. 
Will it jump-start a large segment of the economy, formerly marginal-
ized, or will it simply create a new round of non performing loans? If de 
Soto's examples from Peru and other countries are any indication, the 
project should be highly successful. 
By one estimate22 the Capital Creation Scheme in the next 6-7 years 
could convert at least US$10 billion of dead capital into pledgible capital 
and transfer US$10-15 billion worth of underground economy activities 
into the real economy. 
Grand Project Schemes 
In a break from grassroots-type projects and programs, the Thai 
government has been proposing a number of grand projects designed to 
create new regional centers of economic activity:23 
In January 2003 for example Thaksin announced a 28 billion baht 
($650 million) plan to make the northern city of Chaing Mai an 
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international aviation hub. The initiative aims. to upgrade airport 
facilities and capacity to promote Chiang Mai as an alternative site 
to Bangkok for foreign trade anct investment. 
Also in January 2003 Thaksin unveiled a 100 billion baht plan to 
transform the resort island of Pyhuket into a laboratory for high-
tech research and development. The software industry is one of 
several export businesses the auth9rities hope will be centered 
here. 
In another major initi<;ltive, the government has recently 
resurrected centuries-old plans for cutting a canal through 
Thailand to shorten shipping routes between Europe and East 
Asia. The proposed project, including construction of two harbors, 
a monorail and a highway .across the Isthmus of Kra would cost 
around $35 billion. 
While the EAEM model cannot seive .as the sole basis for future 
growth, it's not clear that massive expenditures of this nature will 
necessarily come up with new seivices in which the country has a clear 
comparative advantage. 
The Vayupak Mutual Fund Initiative 
While the Capital Creation Scheme is aimed chiefly at reviving dead 
capital in the rural sector, a complementary new initiative, the Vayupak 
(named after a mythical bird that sometimes lays a golden egg - but 
other legends depict the avian creature as half-demon24 ) introduced late 
in 2003 is focused on monetizing the dead capital held by the govern-
ment. Estimates are that this initiative25 has the potential to mobilize an 
additional several billion $US worth of excess liquidity from the banking 
system. In all, it could add US$7-8 billion or an additional 10% of the 
market capitalization of Thailand. 
Assessment 
Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra was elected Prime Minister of Thailand 
through one of the biggest electoral victories in Thai history. His 
dramatic victory can be largely attributed to his vision for the Thai 
people. He was able to articulate a coherent economic program that was 
a distinct break from the malaise that had set in after the 1997 crisis. His 
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innovative approach focused on empowering the grassroots population, 
giving them command over resources and enabling them to become 
active participants in the overall development of the country. 
As implemented, Thaksin's program is difficult to characterize - and 
in this sense it is much easier to say what it isn't: it is definitely not pure 
populism as many have labeled it. Certainly it is not the populism 
practiced by Alan Garcia26 in Peru in the 19~0s. Nor does it resemble 
many of the quasi-populist heterodox-incomes policy alternative IMF 
programs introduced in Latin America.27 It is non-confrontational, so it 
does not fall into the non-market sofotion programs often advocated by 
the South in the North-South New International Economic Order 
(NIE0).28 
On the theoretical level, Thaksit}'s program combines clements of 
demand management (Keynesianism), supply side incentives29 
(Reaganomics ), entrepreneurial develop,pient (Schumpeterism30), 
grassroots empowerment (de Sotoism) and the structuralist - non-price 
system reorienting - state led growth of Albert Hirschman.31 It embraces 
globalization and comparative advantage, while at the same time 
attempting to shape the country's comparative advantage through non-
price incentives. 
Because of these varied themes the program can only be dubbed 
Thaksinomics - a unique and complex approach to the challenges posed 
by globalization in general and the rise of China in particular. 
While it is premature to gauge the eventual success or failure of 
Thaksinomics, the program does appear to be off to a good start. The 
next several years are critical for the program's implementation and the 
following considerations will weigh heavily in determining the ultimate 
success or failure of Thaksinomics: 
1. Diagnosis of economic situation. Thaksinomics directly 
addresses the limitations of the EAEM and the Washington 
Consensus. It also is oriented toward solutions to the two key 
challenges facing the Thai economy: the rise of Chinese exports 
and investment competition, and the slowdown of the 
economy's productivity in the 1990s. To date, it appears to be 
based on a correct diagnosis of the economic problems facing 
the country. The major problems encountered will be likely 
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caused by implementation difficulties rather than conceptual 
limitations. 
2. Medium-term performance. The recent surge in growth may 
simply be more utilization ·of capacity stemming from a 
Keynesian fiscal stimulus. The true test will come when the 
economy reaches full capacity. Will the country be able to 
. achieve a high sustainable growth rate generated on the supply 
side through total factor productivity increases? Given China's 
closing of the competitiveness gap (Table 2) progress in this 
area will be the major determining factor in the ultimate success 
or failure of Thaksinomics. 
3. Over-correction on consumption. Managed asset reflation 
through consumption stimulation was the correct policy 
response (2001-2003) to the lingering fall-out of the 1997 crisis. 
However, as the economy-moves into the medium-term (2004-
08), the government must be careful that a movement toward 
consumption and away from the JIAEM investment led model 
does not reduce investment to the point that productivity gains 
are jeopardized.32 
4. Macroeconomic management in the medium-term. In this 
regard, the proper balancing of aggregate consumption-led 
demand and investment-led supply into the medium term may 
prove to be the most challenging task facing Thaksin's 
management team. 
5. Industrial policy, as applied in the One Tambon Project, has not 
been carried out very successfully, even in countries like Japan. 
In other countries, the main difficulties have involved 
objectivity, with choices more often than not made on political 
rather than economic grounds. The One Tambon Project is 
vulnerable to the same difficulties, including 
corruption/cronyism. In addition to an objective project 
selection process, the key here will be the extent to which 
market prices are allowed to define comparative advantage at 
the village level. If this occurs then the system should be able to 
develop a number of new and unique exports. 
6. Dualism. The dual path program must be focused on integrating 
the economy; otherwise it may only compound the existing 
problems of dualism (the coexistence of a modern/foreign 
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multinational and a more traditional economy). Here again a 
common set of market prices must be present in both tracks. 
7. The underground economy. The g.overnment's recent attempts33 
to integrate much of the booming underground economy into 
the formal market economy suggests it is willing to tackle 
dualism, while at the same time expanding the government's 
revenue base. 
8. Financial soundness. Thaksinomics is 'being applied on a rather 
fragile foundation. As the IMF notes: "prospects for sustained 
high growth depend on actic;m to address remaining structural 
weaknesses, especially in the corporate and banking sectors. 
While enterprises made some advances in de-leveraging, their 
balance sheets remain fragile. Lending activity has gained some 
steam, but mostly at state-owned institutions and resolution of 
nonperforming loans at privafe banks continues to be slow." 34 
9. Fiscal capacity. While tempting, the government must not get 
carried away with many of the grand infrastructure projects 
under consideration. These appear to be of somewhat 
questionable value and would severely strain ari already fragile 
financial system. There is also the danger that because more 
and more fiscal items are "off-budget" the real deficit is already 
considerably larger than reported. 
10. Bubble economy. The recent stock-market boom must not be 
allowed to turn into another bubble. The government must 
constrain speculative flows while maintaining its overall 
objective of managed asset reflation. It is encouraging to note 
that unlike the run-up to the 1997 bubble, the Thai authorities 
appear willing to closely monitor35 and to respond quickly to 
quell speculation in the consumer economy and segments of the 
stock and property markets.% 
Conclusion 
Thaksinomics is off to a very promising start in reorienting the Thai 
economy to the new challenges brought on by the rise of China and 
diminishing returns associated with the pre-1997 EAEM model of 
growth. The system is still evolving to meet new economic challenges, a 
sign of its pragmatic problem-solving orientation. 
On broader issues like the war on terrorism, Thaksinomics appears 
well suited to increasing participation of broad segments of the 
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population. Unlike most economic systems in the Middle East, 
Thaksinomics attempts to empower people. If large scale alienation, 
economic exclusions and disenchantment are associated with terrorism, 
then Thaksinomics, with its grassroots orientation, may well pay great 
dividends in this area. The West in general has a high stake in the 
success of Thaksinomics. Certainly many countries that are currently 
experiencing increasing terrorist activity, - such as the Philippines, 
Malaysia and Indonesia - will be carefully watching the Thai experi-
ment. 
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Figure 1 
Relative Ooenness in East Asia 










































Source: Thailand: Selected Issues (Washington: International Monetary Fund, August 2001), p.55 
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Table 2 
Porter's Microeconomic Competitiveness Index 
(relative ranking) 
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Average 
Singapore 10 12 9 9 9 9.8 
Japan 18 14 14 10 11 13.4 
Hong Kong 12 21 16 18 19 17.2 
Taiwan 20 19 21 21 16 19.4 
. 
Korea 28 28 27 26 23 26.4 
Malaysia 27 27 30 37 26 29.4 
Thailand 37 39 40 38 35 37.8 
China 42 49 44 43 38 43.2 
Philippines 45 44 46 53 61 49.8 
Indonesia 51 53 47 55 64 54.0 
Source: Michael E. Porter, "Building the Microeconomic Voundations of Prosperity: Findings From the 
Microeconomic Competitiveness Index, Chapter 1.2, Global Competitiveness Report 2002-2003, p.31 
(New York: World Economic Forum, 2002), p. 31 
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/gcr/GCR _ 2002 _ 2003/GCR _MICI.pdf 
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